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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CHRISTOPHER and RUTH 
CHRISTOPHER, ) 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
LARSON FORD SALES, INC., FORD ) 
MARKETING CORPORATION, and 
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND LOAN ) 
COMPANY, 
vs. 
LARSON 
vs. 
CONDOR 
Defendants-Appellants, 
FORD SALES, INC., 
Defendant-Third Party 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
COACH CORPORATION, ) 
Third Party Defendant. ) 
Case No. 14063 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action seeking recission of a contract of sale 
of a Condor Motor Home. Plaintiffs are buyers, defendant-appellant 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. is the retail seller, Ford Marketing 
Corporation is the manufacturer, and Condor Coach Corporation is 
the assembler and manufacturer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury, verdict and judgment for 
the plaintiff. Defendant Larson Ford Sales, Inc. appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Larson Ford Sales, Inc. seeks the reversal of 
the trial court judgment and entry of judgment of no cause of 
action, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff cannot accept as a complete and accurate 
statement of the material facts those set forth in defendant-
appellant !s brief. The facts he believes are supported by the 
evidence favorable to the verdict of the jury are as follows: 
On or about the 9th of May, 1972, plaintiff and his son, 
Robin Christopher, visited the Larson Ford Sales, Inc. lot in 
Murray, Utah and became interested in purchasing a Condor Coach 
which was exhibited for sale by Larson. 
Their discussions were with Jon P. Larson, who signs 
himself as Vice President of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. Christopher 
advised Larson that the vehicle which was to be purchased was 
for the use of his son Robin in taking children from the American 
Fork Training School on a trip to sell merchandise. It would be 
necessary that the vehicle pull an Econovan which would be 
required after the boys and Robin arrived at the cities where 
sales were to be solicited (R. 397). 
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Larson represented at that time that the Condor Motor 
Home that they were looking at had sufficient power to carry the 
ten boys and pull the Econovan and that a person with such a 
Condor pulled a big horse trailer with four horses in it with no 
problem (R. 397). 
After preliminary examination, the Christophers came to 
the conclusion that the vehicle was the kind that they needed, 
and on the 13th of May a downpayment of $1,500.00 was given on 
the motor home. Again discussion occurred about the ability of 
the Condor to pull the car and haul the boys and Larson assured 
them that that would be no problem (R. 400). Financing was 
arranged through Larson Ford for the purchase price of the vehicle, 
money to be advanced by Murray First Thrift and Loan (R. 24, 
Exhibit 8-P). 
The vehicle was not in operable condition at the time of 
the downpayment and was not operated until the final payment on 
the purchase price of $975.00 (R. 403). On the 19th of May the 
plaintiff and his son Robin hooked the Econovan on to the Condor 
and drove it up Parleys Canyon for a test drive (R. 406). They 
noticed that the vehicle slowed down excessively and that they 
came to the conclusion that it was not sufficiently powered to 
handle the Econovan and carry the ten boys that it was being 
purchased to carry. Plaintiff returned to Larson Ford on the 
20th of May. He discussed with Jon Larson the fact that the 
machine seemed to be gutless and that there was a howling in the 
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rear end and the brakes were defective. In response to this 
information, Jon Larson said to the plaintiff, !lThe brakes we can 
fix it right now. The howl because it is heavy duty commercial 
transmission, the transmission and the motor is all heavy duty 
commercial and they will all do it." They argued some, and then 
Jon Larson said, "Goddam it, man, give us a chance. It set there 
all winter. Let me take it in. We will tune it, then take it to 
the west coast or wherever you are going with it, and then if 
you have got a complaint, bring it back." (R. 409). At that 
time all but the final payment of $975.00 had been paid by 
Christopher on the purchase price of the motor home. Robin's 
version of the conversation is at page 514 of the record. 
Neither of the statements by Robin Christopher or John 
Christopher are contradicted by any testimony. The testimony is 
corroborated by Jon Larson (page 734 of the record). He mentions 
the discussion of the howl in the transmission and that he told 
the Christophers this was normal and that thwn they returned to 
the dealership any problems would be taken care of. 
The Condor was then taken and driven by Robin Christopher 
to California and through the Northwest. During this trip the 
defects appeared in the vehicle which rendered it unfit for the 
Christophers' purpose. 
There were no warranty documents available for delivery 
to Christophers at the completion of the sale. Jon Larson wrote 
out on Larson Ford Sales stationery Exhibit 3-P. The language of 
f 
3-P that is important is flthis unit is fully covered under Ford 
service warranty at time of delivery.'1 And, "we will guarantee 
his service policy as valid and in effect", and is signed Jon P. 
Larson, V. Pres. 
Larsons were kept informed of the problems as they arose 
on the Northwest trip. 
Immediately upon getting the vehicle back to Salt Lake 
City, Christopher requested that the sale be rescinded. This 
remedy was refused by Larson Ford. 
Christopher was unable to get the vehicle back to Salt 
Lake without having it serviced at Reno, Nevada by a Ford agency. 
Exhibit 6-P reveals the rear end was repaired, the starter motor 
and relay replaced, and Christopher advised concerning the defective 
condition of the vehicle (R. 424). 
Plaintiff produced an expert witness, Haslam, who had 26 
years of mechanic experience, worked on buses for Lewis Bros. 
Stages, was employed as a mechanic working on buses, trucks and 
cars for Granite School District where he was still employed. 
He testified that he discovered the following defects in 
the Condor: (1) The starter solenoid was mounted on the chassis 
so close to the exhaust manifold that it got hot, which caused it 
to malfunction (R. 609). (2) The generator at the fuel pump was 
crossthreaded and sucked air instead of fuel (R. 611). (3) The 
fuel line to the generator was put in so that it only picked up 
when the tank was above half full and would operate only out of 
the top half of the tank (R. 613). (4) The engine was mounted 
on the chassis in a manner that restricted the air supply, and 
it was Haslam's opinion that the air supply was not adequate to 
permit the engine to operate properly (R. 621). (5) There was a 
howl in the rear end in the differential (R. 623) and the howl 
sounded like a mismatch between the green gear and pinion, that 
the transmission, drive line and differential were too small to 
handle the motor home (R. 624) . 
On June 3 plaintiff talked to Jon Larson about the troubles 
that Robin Christopher had had with the motor home. He was told 
the fact that the motor home would not go over grades at a 
reasonable speed, and the starting problem. He told Jon that 
they would have to bring the machine back, that it was a lemon 
and wouldn't do the job for them (R. 415). Jon Larson replied, 
lfI am only the Vice President. I can't make the decisions and 
Park, my brother, is out of town, and I will certainly take it 
up and see what we can do." (R. 416) . 
On the 23rd of June a conversation occurred between 
plaintiff and the sales manager of Larson Ford. Christopher was 
instructed to bring the machine back to Salt Lake City (R. 418). 
The motor home was in the Ford outlet at Reno, Nevada for repairs. 
Christopher drove the motor home from Reno to Salt Lake 
and experienced the same general problems that had been reported. 
As soon as the vehicle was in Salt Lake, it was delivered to the 
witness Haslam's home (R. 426). The next morning Christopher 
discussed the matter with Jon Larson (R. 428), advised him that 
I 
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he wanted to bring the motor home back as it was not satisfactory. 
Jon Larson replied, "You have bought yourself a new machine and 
I won't discuss it with you." (R. 429). 
A great deal of testimony was produced by all parties to 
the legal action. The court instructed the jury and submitted 
the matter to the jury on two basic propositions—fraud and breach 
of warranty. As to the fraud which would justify rescission of 
the sale by the buyer, two basic propositions were submitted, 
whether or not the seller knew that the representations he made 
were false or made them recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such a representation. Jon Larson 
had never used the coach and had no information on its ability to 
do the jobs required. 
Court also submitted the matter to the jury on the basis 
of whether or not the plaintiff could rescind as a result of 
breach of warranty on the basis that the motor vehicle to be 
merchantable must be at least such as was fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which such goods are used. It is noted that the 
appellant does not take issue with any of the court's instructions 
and it appeared that the instructions were free from substantial 
error on which reversal of the case could be predicated. 
Appellant made its complaint over against Condor Coach 
Corporation based on a warranty theory. Plaintiff submits this 
amounts to an acceptance as true the claims of breach of warranty 
by plaintiff. 
-7-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BREACH OF WARRANTY WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The evidence clearly established without contradiction 
that the Condor Coach was so defect ive that it was not useable 
for the ordinary purposes for which such vehicles are used and 
was therefore not merchantable. 
U.C.A. 70A-2-314, entitled "Implied warranty -
Merchantability - Usage of trade11, in subsection 2(c), defines 
merchantability as: "Goods to be merchantable must be at least 
such as (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such 
goods are used;". 
In addition to the foregoing section of the Utah Code, 
plaintiff claimed that the appellant breached U.C.A. 70A-2-315, 
entitled "Implied warranty - Fitness for particular purpose". 
This section covers the situation where the buyer makes known 
to the seller a particular purpose for which the goods are to be 
used and required. l> 
The evidence clearly shows that the vehicle would not 
operate at a reasonable speed, could not be started after it was 
warmed up and had been driven far enough to heat up the solenoid, 
that it was underpowered, and that its differential and drive 
train were inadequate. This evidence shows the violation of both 
sections of the Utah Code Annotated. 
Utah law concerning the type of breach of warranty claimed 
by plaintiff has been clear for many, many years. In 1917 this 
court decided Studebaker Bros. Co. of Utah v. Anderson, et al, 
50 Utah 319^ 167 Pac. 663. The case involved a situation very 
similar to the present case and contained both a breach of implied 
warranty of merchantability and a breach of warranty for specific 
use. 
Buyer, in the Studebaker case, purchased a used vehicle 
for the purpose of carrying passengers to the New Grand Hotel 
and to the railroad depot, The vehicle proved to be inadequate. 
It was conceded that it was defective. Seller attempted to make 
the vehicle run, but could not do so. 
Buyer had advised seller that he knew nothing of vehicles 
and related the kind of work that had to do with the vehicle. 
This court held that under the circumstances there was a breach 
of warranty and that the seller was liable under an express 
warranty, having represented that the vehicle was reasonably fit 
for the purpose it had been advised the buyer needed to have 
satisfied. The remedy available was rescission, the remedy which 
respondent-buyer here seeks. 
In the case of Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 
161, 253 Pac. 196, the court reaffirmed its prior holding and 
added that where a vendee has been induced to purchase by deceit, 
he has his choice of remedies upon the discovery of the fraud. 
He may affirm the contract and sue for damages, or he may rescind 
it and sue for his price, 
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A modern and current holding of the court decided in 1971 
is Vernon v. Lake Motor, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P. 2d 302. The 
Vernon case is important to plaintiff's position as it points out 
that the conduct of the parties is important in warranty actions. 
At page 275 the court stated: 
MThe warranty should be given effect, not in any 
unduly precise or technical interpretation, but 
in accordance with what the ordinary purchaser 
would understand from its language; and if there 
is any uncertainty therein as to how it should 
apply, the conduct of the parties in performing 
under it may be looked to to determine its meaning." 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence and the law 
fully support the action of the trial court and the jury verdict. 
POINT II 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED AT THE TRIAL JUSTIFYING REVERSAL. 
The trial court carefully prepared instructions submitting 
the issues to be determined by the jury on two basic theories. 
First, on the basis of fraud, and second, on breach of implied 
warranty of merchantability. 
It, in instruction No. 9, clearly laid the groundwork for 
the instructions that followed relating to the basic requirements 
to be met by the plaintiff in order to succeed. Instruction No. 
10 (R. 150) set down the various requirements as to the evidence 
to be submitted in a fraud case. Instruction No. 11 (R. 152) set 
down the various elements that plaintiff was required to prove. 
Appellant does not claim that there was not a careful, 
correct and error-free set of instructions given to the jury, but 
does claim that the evidence does not rise to the necessary 
proof for submission to the jury. 
The evidence is clear, uncontradicted and, respondent 
submits, convincing. 
Jon Larson, the source of representations to the plaintiff, 
knew nothing about the actual operating capacity of the Condor 
Coach which he was selling. His knowledge and experience being 
limited to those generally in the same line of manufactured goods. 
However, he represented that this particular coach would do the 
job that plaintiff needed done. Even when closely questioned 
about whether or not it would, he induced plaintiff to go forward 
by representing that the defects were due to a winter's lack of 
use and by promising the vehicle could be returned if it proved 
inadequate on the trip to the Northwest contemplated by purchasers. 
Larson supplied the handwritten warranty, Exhibit #3, to facilitate 
servicing of the vehicle and set forth that it had a new vehicle 
warranty by the Ford Motor Company. 
None of the evidence relating to the representations nor 
their falsity were seriously contraverted by sworn testimony. 
In the position taken by appellant, i.e. that Condor Coach breached 
its warranty, it admitted the vehicle's inadequacy and admitted 
that it had induced the purchaser to try it out and see if it 
would not do the job which purchaser needed accomplished. 
Plaintiff submits that this evidence is clear, convincing, 
and, as a matter of fact, undisputed and would justify the jury's 
finding in his favor under the fraud theory. 
_ i i _ 
POINT III 
MERCHANTABILITY WAS CLEARLY DEFINED BY THE COURT. 
The court also submitted the matter to the jury under the 
breach of warranty of merchantability. Instruction No. 12 (R. 154) 
sets forth this general theory. 
One of the arguments made by appellant is that the court 
erred in submitting the issue to the jury on the question of 
merchantability and did not define what merchantability was. 
In instruction No. 12 the court did define, in accordance 
with the statute heretofore quoted, what goods to be merchantable 
must be and stated: 
"Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such 
goods are used.11 
The evidence clearly demonstrated and, plaintiff submits, 
the appellant has conceded that the Condor Coach did not meet the 
standard of merchantability. 
The many defects that the witness Haslam outlined in his 
testimony clearly reveal that the Condor Coach was not useable 
for the ordinary purposes for which it was manufactured. His 
testimony is uncontradicted and while, in some instances, it is 
disputed, no witness took the witness stand to deny that the 
defects he encountered were not present. 
Plaintiff submits that the jury could well have found that 
a Condor Coach with a solenoid so close to the exhaust manifold 
that it got hot and the heat caused it to malfunction, was not 
reasonably fit for the purpose intended; or that a Condor Coach 
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where the generator sucked air instead of fuel would not be 
reasonably fit for the purpose; or that a Condor Coach with a 
fuel line to the generator put in so that it only picked up when 
the gas tank was above half full would not be fit for the ordinary 
purpose; or that a Condor Coach with an engine mounted on the 
chassis in such a manner as to unduly restrict the air supply; 
or that a Condor Coach with a howl in the rear end indicating a 
mismatch between the green gear and the pinion; or a Condor Coach 
with a drive line and differential too small to handle the motor 
home was not fit for the ordinary purpose for which the Condor 
Coach was manufactured. In this instance we had a Condor Coach 
with all of these defects in it. It is respectfully submitted 
that each defect the jury could have found rendered the Condor 
Coach not reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended. 
One of the arguments made by the appellant was that it 
should have been given an opportunity to make further repairs. 
It will oe recalled that the Condor Coach had been in the hands 
of appellant since June 10, 1970, practically two years, and the 
various defects had not been remedied if, in fact, they could 
have been remedied for a reasonable sum. Certainly the air 
supplied to the engine and differential would have been major 
items that could not have been fixed without extensive remodeling 
and repair work. 
Our Utah law permits the buyer to have rescission or 
keep the vehicle and claim the damages by comparison of value 
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with price. Under Utah law a buyer may not be required to keep 
a defective vehicle, but may return it to the dealer and obtain 
his money. Studebaker Bros. Co. of Utah v. Anderson, et al, 50 
Utah 319, 167 Pac. 663, page 8, and Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor 
Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 Pac. 196, page 8. This shifts the 
responsibility for placing the vehicle in a reasonable and useable 
condition to the dealer where, it is respectfully submitted, it 
should ultimately come to rest. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence supported 
the submission of the plaintiff's claims to the jury, that the 
instructions of the court were entirely consistent with the 
evidence and were proper statements of the law as it applied to 
plaintiff1s case. It is further respectfully submitted that the 
verdict was a fair, just and equitable disposition of the dispute, 
that the parties had their day in court where their opportunity 
to present any defensive matter was clearly protected. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the court should affirm 
the jury verdict and the judgment of the trial court in plaintiff's 
favor and against defendant Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
_ i /, _ 
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